Combat information is a piece of raw information that is
unprocessed, uncorroborated, unconfirmed and often perishable in nature but of
immense value to a commander due to the criticality of a situation. It is for
the commander to assess the value of this information and use it for his
decision making. Here is a typical example of combat information.
It happened in 1984 at Trincomalee, Srilanka. I was the
Commanding Officer of an Electronic Warfare Unit taking part in Op Pawan and I
had to spend a week with a brigade Headquarters deployed in Trnicomalee. It
turned out to be a very memorable experience. I met with Col Raman, Deputy
Brigade Commander who impressed me as a military professional. He had a good
understanding of signal intelligence. He also had innovative ideas on how to
develop tactical intelligence. We had discussions on how to employ intelligence
resources and we worked on a methodology to share tactical signal intelligence
and combat information. Col Raman and I could also work out innovative ideas in
gathering information and fashioning quick and timely responses and actions. In
a matter of two days we became very close to each other spending time together
in the Ops Room and Officers Mess. The Mess staff belonged to Madras Regiment
and they served excellent food, especially exotic variety of sea food!
One of my detachments
was co-located with this Headquarters carrying out interception of hostile
communications. I was staying in a tent near the Officers’ Mess and my detachment
was about 400 m away. I had a SOP for handling of intercepts. As soon as an
important intercept was received the operator would contact me and if I wanted,
he would come running to me with the transcript. Often I used to run towards
the detachment and the operator used to meet me midway! It was relatively calm in
the general area of Trincomalee but we had some information about militant
movements. One evening while I was in the Officers’ Mess I got a call from my
detachment commander saying there was something very interesting. I rushed to
the detachment and listened to the recorded intercept. It was a conversation
between two militants in a casual and relaxed manner. A group of militants had
assembled at a house and they were seeing a Tamil movie “Chiraparuvi”. The guy
who made the call was on duty outside the house taking care of security. He
gave out the names of some of the militants in the house during the chat with
his friend. I rushed back to the Officers’ Mess and called Col Raman aside; I briefed
him about the intercept. The Deputy Brigade Commander was excited; he in turn
spoke to the Brigade Commander on phone and immediately swung into action. He
had an intelligence picture but with some gaps. The information that I gave
helped him in getting a clearer picture, actionable intelligence, for a field
commander. With the quick reaction team and additional personnel available at
the Brigade Headquarters, he formed a raid party and moved it for action. I
gave a small mobile detachment in support. The raid was executed in time while
the militants were still seeing the movie. It was a swift and surprise action;
the alert by the lookout man was too late and all the militants were captured
while attempting to escape.
This was the first major success for 340 Independent Infantry
Brigade in Srilanka!
Had this raw piece of
information been delayed in processing or dissemination at any stage it would
have been of little use. Had the Commander not factored this information into
his intelligence picture it wold not have prompted an action. Had the action
been delayed it would not have met with success. It was a great experience that
I could share with my students on EW courses when I was Head, EW Wing MCTE.
This combat information was indeed valuable and highly perishable, in that
situation. The commander had to factor this information to his tactical
intelligence picture and most importantly take quick and coordinated action in
time that yielded spectacular success! It was another significant achievement
for the first EW Unit to be in Op Pawan, 12 Field Sub Group. This Sub Group had
performed extremely well in Jaffna to provide intimate EW support to field
forces on its induction into Srilanka. I can proudly say that we were highly
innovative and often very bold and unconventional in employing the resources in
the war against LTTE. After this initial experience in Jaffna we had moved into
the central parts of Srilanka and I had deployed the Unit in several places
including Vavunia, Mannar, Mankulam, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee. Thanks to the pioneering
efforts of 12 Field Sub Group, the commanders at all levels, battalion,
brigade, division and IPKF Headquarters, became increasingly dependent on
inputs from EW, realizing its potential as an effective force multiplier!
