The India-Pakistan war in 1971 was short and swift culminating in
a historic win for the Indian Army. However tension prevailed on our Western
border even after the ceasefire agreement. Pakistani troops often provoked the
Indians by opening fire while Indian troops deployed on the border had
instructions to exercise restraint and not to retaliate without getting
permission from higher Headquarters. The authority to give the permission to
open fire with long range weapons was vested with the Command Headquarters and Army
Headquarters depending on the gravity of situation and type of weapons used by
the Pakistanis.
This incident was narrated by a
course mate of mine posted at the Headquarters of an infantry division. This
Division had troops deployed all along the border eye ball to eye ball with the
Pakistani troops. The GOC of the Division was
an unconventional commander with a remarkable record as a brigade commander. The GOC used to play bridge at the Officers
Mess in the evening with his officers. One
day when a game of bridge was in progress the Colonel General Staff (Col GS) came
in and spoke to the GOC requesting him to come to the Divisional Operations Room
for an emergency. The GOC asked the Col GS what the matter was and urged him to
speak without hesitation. The Col GS narrated an incident at a border out post
where the Pakistanis had opened fire with machine guns inflicting fatal casualties on
the Indians. The GOC listened to the Col GS and promptly asked him to answer
with artillery. There was stunned silence in not only around the bridge table
but in the entire Officers Mess. The Col GS was about to say something but the GOC
cut him short by repeating what he told him earlier, “answer with artillery”.
The GOC went on to bid, “3 no trumps”! The game of bridge continued without
interruption! The rest was history. The
Pakis got a severe jolt. The Indian troops felt charged. The Corps Commander
and the Army Commander had to agree with the GOC’s decision, grudgingly or
otherwise. Army HQ justified it publicly albeit there were several questions
asked internally. But in the eyes of his officers and men the GOC had become a
hero.
My course mate, a young captain, was
thoroughly impressed by the GOC’s manner of quick and bold decision making. In
my analysis it was a programmed response although it appeared unpremeditated
and spontaneous to those present at the Officers Mess. The GOC didn’t waste any
time to arrive at a decision because he had thought about such a situation and
he was clear about his response. A great general!
